Background
The history of war risks insurance traces back to the Napoleonic Wars and the formation of state war risk schemes during the First and Second World Wars. In modern practice, war risks for ocean-going commercial vessels are written predominantly through three channels: the commercial Lloyd’s and IUA market using the Institute War Clauses; mutual war risks clubs (notably the Hellenic War Risks, the Combined Group of War Risks Associations, and individual P&I clubs that offer war cover as an extension); and the state war risk schemes of certain flag states. The structure of cover, the Joint War Committee Listed Areas system that drives premium for transits through high-risk areas, and the interaction between war risks and sanctions form the core practical knowledge required.
The post-2022 environment has materially elevated the importance of war risks insurance. The Russian invasion of Ukraine reshaped Black Sea trading patterns and triggered the largest war risks claims environment in decades. The 2023-2024 Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden have caused tens of major incidents, multiple total losses and a complete diversion of much commercial shipping around the Cape of Good Hope. Persistent piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea and Singapore Strait, periodic flare-ups in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, and the structural instability across the Mediterranean and Eastern Africa make war risks underwriting more central to global trade than at any point since the Iran-Iraq tanker war of the 1980s.
Fundamentals of War Risks Cover
War risks cover for hull is structured to mirror the underlying H&M policy. The vessel is insured against the war perils for an amount equal to (or in some cases greater than) the H&M insured value, and the cover responds to physical loss of or damage to the vessel caused by war perils. The annual premium is typically a small fraction of the H&M premium for vessels that do not transit high-risk areas, with the bulk of war risks revenue coming from additional premium charged for specific high-risk transits.
The principal cover heads are:
Hull war risks: Loss of or damage to the vessel.
War risks P&I (Bio-Chem cover): Third-party liability arising from war perils, including pollution, personal injury and wreck removal where war perils are the proximate cause. Mainstream P&I cover is restricted by the war exclusion in club rules, and the International Group’s war risks P&I extension fills the gap.
Loss of Hire war risks: Loss of charter hire during periods of detention, blockade, capture or seizure, where extended.
Crew war bonus and personal accident: Specific covers for crew indemnification in war zones.
Kidnap and Ransom (K&R): Cover for ransom payments and associated negotiation costs where crew or vessel are seized by pirates or terrorists.
Trade disruption: Specialist cover for the financial consequences of port closures, blockades and embargoes.
Institute War Clauses
The Institute War Clauses (Hulls Time) dated 1/11/95 are the dominant wording for hull war risks. The clauses are designed to be incorporated into a separate war risks policy that runs in parallel with the H&M policy. The structure mirrors ITC-Hulls but the perils insured against are the war perils excluded from H&M:
War, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection or civil strife arising therefrom, or any hostile act by or against a belligerent power; capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detainment, and the consequences thereof or any attempt thereat; derelict mines, torpedoes, bombs or other derelict weapons of war.
Strikes, locked-out workmen, or persons taking part in labour disturbances, riots or civil commotions; any terrorist or any person acting maliciously or from a political motive; confiscation or expropriation.
The Institute War and Strikes Clauses (Cargo) provide equivalent cover for cargo interests and are typically written together with the underlying cargo insurance using Institute Cargo Clauses A, B or C.
Exclusions in Standard H&M
Clause 23 of ITC-Hulls 1/11/95 (the war and strikes exclusion) and the analogous “Free of Capture and Seizure” provisions in cargo policies exclude losses caused by:
War, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection or civil strife arising therefrom, or any hostile act by or against a belligerent power; capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detainment (barratry and piracy excepted), and the consequences thereof or any attempt thereat; derelict mines, torpedoes, bombs or other derelict weapons of war; strikes, locked-out workmen, or persons taking part in labour disturbances, riots or civil commotions; any terrorist or any person acting maliciously or from a political motive.
The exclusion in standard H&M defines the scope of the gap that war risks insurance fills. The boundary between H&M and war risks cover is therefore the proximate cause analysis: was the loss caused by an insured marine peril or by an insured war peril? In most cases the answer is straightforward, but disputes arise where multiple causes interact (a vessel grounding while evading a missile strike; a fire of unknown origin in a war zone; piracy interacting with marine collisions during evasive manoeuvres). The proximate cause doctrine, codified in section 55 of the UK Marine Insurance Act 1906, is critical: the insurer responsible for the proximate cause bears the loss.
JWC Listed Areas
The Joint War Committee (JWC) is a committee of London market underwriters operating under the auspices of the Lloyd’s Market Association and the International Underwriting Association. The JWC publishes a list of “JWC Listed Areas” identifying geographies considered to present elevated war, terrorism, piracy and related risks. Inclusion on the JWC list does not legally preclude trading to the area, but it triggers the requirement under most war risks policies for the assured to give notice to underwriters before trading and to pay an additional premium (“AP”) for the transit.
The JWC list is reviewed approximately quarterly and is responsive to evolving threat assessments. Areas that have been on the list at various times include:
- Black Sea and Sea of Azov (since February 2022)
- Russian and Ukrainian Black Sea waters
- Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb (added in modified scope from 2023, with Houthi attacks)
- Yemen ports and territorial waters
- Somalia and adjacent Indian Ocean piracy waters
- Gulf of Guinea and West African coastal waters
- Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz
- Israeli ports during periods of conflict
- Lebanese, Syrian and Libyan ports during periods of conflict
The JWC listing for any given area specifies the precise geographical limits (often by coordinates), and these limits drive the AP analysis and the contractual reporting obligations.
Additional Premium (AP) Calculation
The additional premium for transit of a JWC Listed Area is the principal commercial mechanism of war risks insurance. The structure is typically:
The hull war risks policy provides a “breach” obligation under which the assured must give written notice to underwriters before the vessel enters a JWC Listed Area, with sufficient lead time (typically 48 to 72 hours) for underwriters to quote terms.
Underwriters quote an AP expressed as a percentage of the insured hull value (typically per 7-day period of exposure). Quotes are firm for a short period (typically 48 hours) and conditional on the actual track and timing remaining within stated parameters.
Once accepted, the AP is held cover for the duration of the transit, with extensions, deviations and additional calls handled through real-time exchange between brokers and underwriters.
Indicative AP rates as observed in the market (these vary substantially with threat conditions and individual vessel circumstances):
- Black Sea Ukrainian ports (2023-2024): 0.5 to 2.5 percent of hull value per 7 days
- Red Sea / Bab el-Mandeb (2024-2025): 0.3 to 1.5 percent per 7 days, with significant variation by flag, ownership, cargo and recent track record
- Gulf of Aden (Somalia piracy era): 0.05 to 0.25 percent per 7 days
- Persian Gulf during Iran-related tensions: 0.05 to 0.5 percent per 7 days
- Gulf of Guinea: 0.05 to 0.20 percent per 7 days
The market for transit AP is highly volatile and responds in real time to events. A single high-profile attack can drive AP up by a factor of three or more within hours, and the broker-underwriter dialogue during heightened tension is one of the most dynamic elements of the marine insurance market.
Kidnap and Ransom (K&R) Extension
K&R cover responds to ransom demands following the seizure of a vessel and her crew by pirates, terrorists or criminal groups. The cover typically includes:
Ransom payments, subject to an indemnity limit (typically five to twenty-five million United States dollars per occurrence)
Costs of crisis response consultants engaged in the negotiation (firms such as Control Risks, Olive Group, Ambrey Risk and Risk Intelligence Maritime are typical responders)
Costs of delivery of the ransom (security escorts, currency conversion, logistics)
Personal accident and personal hardship payments to crew during captivity
Legal and consultancy costs of dealing with regulatory authorities, including OFAC and equivalent sanctions regulators (a critical point given that ransom payments to designated persons or entities can violate sanctions)
The Somali piracy era (approximately 2008 to 2013) drove K&R into the marine market and remains the formative period. The Gulf of Guinea piracy environment that emerged from approximately 2018 has been a continuing source of K&R claims, with Nigerian, Cameroonian and Ghanaian waters generating most incidents.
The interaction between K&R cover and the Best Management Practices (BMP) developed by the shipping industry is significant: compliance with BMP measures (hardening, citadels, armed guards in some areas, transit reporting) is often a condition of cover and a requirement for AP discounts.
Current High-Risk Areas
Black Sea and Sea of Azov: Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, all Black Sea trading carries significant war risk premium. The Black Sea Grain Initiative (2022-2023) and the subsequent Ukrainian-organised humanitarian corridor for grain exports have demonstrated that commercial shipping can resume despite active conflict, but multiple Russian missile strikes on commercial vessels have produced significant claims. Insurance schemes coordinated by Marsh and Aon, with backing from Ukrainian state guarantees and London market capacity, have provided dedicated cover for grain corridor transits.
Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden: From late 2023, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping linked (according to the attackers) to Israeli interests have produced multiple total losses including the Galaxy Leader (seized November 2023), the True Confidence (sunk March 2024), the Tutor (sunk June 2024), the Rubymar (sunk March 2024) and others. The campaign has caused the largest diversion of commercial traffic since the Suez Canal closure of 1967 to 1975, with the majority of Asia-Europe container traffic routing around the Cape of Good Hope at significant additional cost. War risks underwriters have absorbed major losses while AP rates have moved sharply higher.
Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz: Tanker seizures by Iran (the Stena Impero 2019, the Mercer Street drone strike 2021, multiple seizures during 2023-2025) have kept Persian Gulf war risks in focus. The Strait of Hormuz remains a chokepoint through which approximately twenty percent of global oil and a third of LNG transits, and a significant escalation involving Iran could produce immediate and severe market dislocation.
Gulf of Guinea: Nigerian, Beninois, Cameroonian and Ghanaian waters have been the most persistent piracy hotspot of the past decade, with kidnapping for ransom rather than vessel hijacking the dominant tactic. Industry response under BMP-WA (Best Management Practices for West Africa) has reduced the frequency of incidents from peak levels, but the area remains JWC-listed and AP applies to most transits.
Somali Basin and Western Indian Ocean: Following the resurgence of Somali piracy from late 2023, with several successful hijackings of bulk carriers, the Indian Ocean has returned to being a high-risk area subject to BMP-5 (Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea).
Singapore Strait: Persistent low-level armed robbery against ships at anchor and underway makes the Singapore Strait a region of concern, although the typical loss profile (theft of cash and personal effects rather than vessel hijack) has not produced JWC listing. Local insurance arrangements address most exposures.
War Risks and Sanctions Interplay
The relationship between war risks insurance and sanctions regimes has become one of the most complex areas of marine insurance practice. Key considerations:
OFAC and EU sanctions on Russia: The G7 price cap mechanism on Russian oil exports (effective December 2022) requires P&I attestations and indirectly creates a parallel insurance regime in which non-cap-compliant cargoes cannot obtain mainstream coverage. War risks underwriters have largely withdrawn from Russian-linked tonnage, leaving a “dark fleet” trading without conventional cover.
Iran sanctions: OFAC primary and secondary sanctions on Iran have effectively excluded Iranian-linked tonnage and cargo from mainstream marine insurance for over a decade.
Designated person and entity exposures: The risk of paying a ransom to a sanctioned person, vessel or organisation is non-trivial. K&R cover requires careful coordination with sanctions compliance and may require regulatory licensing in cases involving sanctioned actors (notably Houthi-linked or Hamas-linked entities).
Sanctions exclusion clauses: Modern war risks policies contain comprehensive sanctions exclusion clauses that void cover where payment would breach sanctions. The drafting evolves continuously to track the changing sanctions landscape.
Insurance-related sanctions: Sanctions targeting marine insurance providers (notably Russian sanctions on Lloyd’s and the International Group, and Western sanctions on Russian state insurance entities) further complicate the operational landscape.
The compliance burden on shipowners, charterers, brokers, P&I clubs and war risks underwriters has increased materially since 2022 and shows no sign of reducing. Real-time AIS monitoring, satellite tracking, attestation regimes and dynamic policy provisions have become standard features of the war risks contract.
Trade Disruption and Specialist Covers
Beyond physical loss covers, specialist war risks markets offer:
Trade disruption insurance: Cover for the financial consequences of port closures, blockades, embargoes and similar non-physical disruptions.
Crew war bonus: Indemnification of the additional crew wages payable for service in declared war zones, an obligation under many ITF (International Transport Workers’ Federation) collective bargaining agreements.
Loss of hire war: Extension of standard Loss of Hire cover to include detention by war perils.
Confiscation and expropriation: Specialist political risk cover sometimes structured as a credit insurance product rather than a marine product.
War on Land: Cover for vessels in port or shipyard exposed to war perils ashore (notably relevant where ships are under repair in conflict zones).
Claims Handling in War Risks
War risks claims are generally handled through the same brokers and adjusters as H&M, but with additional complexity:
The proximate cause analysis is often contested between H&M and war risks underwriters, particularly in cases of partial loss following damage in a high-risk area.
The political and regulatory complexity (sanctions clearance, dealings with foreign governments, recovery of vessels held in foreign ports) requires specialist legal expertise.
The aggregation question (how multiple losses from a single conflict event are aggregated for reinsurance purposes) is critical for underwriters and follows specific contract wording, often the Lloyd’s “single event” definitions.
The salvage and recovery process can be protracted: the Stena Impero was held in Iran for two months in 2019; the Galaxy Leader has been held in Yemen since November 2023.
Hull War Risks vs War Risks P&I
The hull war risks policy and the war risks P&I extension are distinct covers serving different purposes:
Hull war risks indemnifies the assured for physical loss of or damage to the vessel from war perils, mirroring the H&M cover but for the war perils excluded from H&M. The cover responds on the same property indemnity principles as H&M and is typically written by the same underwriting community.
War risks P&I indemnifies the assured for third-party liabilities arising from war perils: pollution from the vessel after a missile strike, personal injury and death claims by crew killed or injured in attack, wreck removal of the vessel after war loss. Standard P&I cover excludes war risks (clubs apply their own war exclusion), and the war risks P&I extension fills the gap. The cover is written by the International Group through specific arrangements coordinating with hull war risks underwriters.
The interaction between hull war and war P&I is structured to avoid gaps: the hull war underwriter handles the property loss, the war P&I cover handles the liability exposures, and the contractual coordination ensures that both respond seamlessly to a single war event.
Cargo War Cover Operational Aspects
Cargo war cover, written under the Institute War Clauses (Cargo) 1/1/09, has several distinguishing features:
Period of cover: Cargo war cover typically attaches when the goods are loaded on board the overseas vessel and terminates on the earliest of (a) discharge from the vessel at port of destination, (b) the expiry of 15 days from arrival, or (c) commencement of land transit at the destination. The on-water-only profile differs from standard cargo cover (which provides warehouse-to-warehouse cover with more extensive land transit periods).
Charter party warranties: Many cargo war policies include warranties as to vessel acceptability, classification, age and trading history. Vessels trading to high-risk areas or with sanctions-affected ownership may require specific underwriter approval before cover attaches.
Held cover provisions: Where a vessel is unexpectedly diverted to a war zone or where war breaks out during transit, the cargo war cover typically continues subject to additional premium and any underwriter conditions, but with limits on the duration and circumstances of the held cover.
Aggregations: Underwriters monitor cargo war aggregations on individual vessels (where multiple cargoes from different shippers are insured under separate policies but exposed to the same vessel risk) and on individual port aggregations (where multiple cargoes are exposed to a single port closure or attack risk).
Wordings Beyond the Institute Clauses
While the Institute War Clauses dominate the London market, alternative wordings are used in specific contexts:
Nordic Plan war risks: The Nordic Marine Insurance Plan includes war risks within its broader hull cover framework, with chapters specifically addressing war perils. The Nordic approach differs from the standalone Institute War Clauses model.
American Institute Hull War Risks: A US wording used predominantly for US-flag tonnage and US Maritime Administration programmes.
Bespoke programmes: Major fleet operators sometimes negotiate bespoke war risks programmes combining elements of the Institute Clauses with individual modifications addressing the specific trading pattern, fleet structure and risk appetite of the operator.
Practical Operational Considerations
Operating a vessel with war risks cover involves several practical considerations:
Notification systems: Modern ship managers operate AIS-based monitoring and notification systems that automatically alert the broker and underwriters when a vessel approaches a JWC Listed Area, triggering the AP quotation process.
Routing decisions: Many shipowners and charterers now route around high-risk areas even where AP would be available, reflecting concerns about crew safety, vessel security and reputational exposure. The Cape of Good Hope routing in lieu of Suez/Red Sea transits is the most prominent current example.
Crew bonus and welfare: Service in declared war zones triggers ITF crew bonus obligations (typically a doubling of basic wages plus enhanced sick pay and death and disability benefits). Some operators decline war zone trading to avoid the operational complications of the bonus structure.
Vessel hardening: BMP-compliant hardening (razor wire, citadels, water cannons, hardened bridge windows) is often a condition of cover and a requirement for AP discounts. The cost of hardening must be balanced against the AP savings achievable.
Armed guards: Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) embarked for transit through specific high-risk areas (notably the Indian Ocean Somali piracy area) require specific approvals from flag states, port states and underwriters. Standardised contracts (BIMCO GUARDCON) and rules of engagement are critical.
Communications: Continuous reporting to underwriters during war zone transit is typically required, with daily position reports, deviation requests and incident notifications.
Recovery and Salvage in War Casualties
Recovery of vessels following war casualties presents particular challenges:
Detention recoveries: Where a vessel is detained by a foreign government (Iranian seizure of the Stena Impero 2019, Yemeni seizure of the Galaxy Leader 2023), recovery requires diplomatic, legal and commercial coordination over extended periods.
Salvage operations in war zones: Conducting salvage operations in active conflict zones is logistically and legally complex. Salvors require armed escorts, deconfliction with belligerent forces, and operational windows that may close suddenly.
Wreck removal: Wreck removal following war casualty in a war zone (such as the Tutor or Rubymar in the Red Sea) may be deferred until conditions permit. Underwriters may face extended liability accruals while wrecks remain in place.
Sanctions clearance for recovery: Recovery of a vessel held in a sanctioned jurisdiction requires careful sanctions analysis: payments to local authorities, port charges, towage and pilotage all involve sanctions screening.
Mutual War Risks and State Schemes
Beyond the commercial market, two alternative providers exist:
Mutual war risks clubs: The Hellenic War Risks Mutual is the largest, providing war risks cover for predominantly Greek-controlled tonnage. The Combined Group of War Risks Associations (a coalition of smaller mutuals) provides comparable cover. Mutual war risks operate on the same principles as P&I clubs, with members sharing losses on a mutual basis.
State war risk schemes: Several flag states (the United States via the War Risk Insurance Programme administered by MARAD, the United Kingdom historically through Ministry of Defence and Department for Transport schemes) maintain backstop arrangements for vessels engaged in essential trade during major conflicts. These schemes have been activated in past wars and remain available as contingency.
Cyber Risk and War Risks
The intersection of cyber risk and war risks insurance is one of the most rapidly developing areas of marine insurance practice:
Cyber war exclusion: The Lloyd’s Market Association cyber exclusion (LMA5403 and successor wordings) excludes from war risks cover losses arising from cyber operations, malicious cyber acts and cyber-related war and similar events. The exclusion has been progressively tightened to address state-sponsored cyber attacks.
State-attributed cyber attacks: Where a cyber attack is attributable to a state actor (notably Russia, North Korea, Iran or China-linked actors), the war risks underwriter may apply the war exclusion to deny cover, even where the operation does not amount to traditional armed conflict. The “war or warlike operations” definition has expanded to encompass certain cyber activities.
NotPetya and the Mondelez/Merck precedents: The 2017 NotPetya cyber attack, attributed to Russian state actors, triggered major cyber insurance disputes including the Mondelez and Merck cases under property cyber covers. While these precedents arose in property insurance, the principles affect marine cyber war exclusions.
Specific cyber covers: Bespoke marine cyber covers have developed in the commercial market to fill the gap between traditional war risks (which exclude cyber) and traditional cyber covers (which exclude marine and war). Capacity is concentrated in a small group of specialist underwriters and remains insufficient for the largest exposures.
Operational cyber events: A cyber attack on the navigation system, propulsion system or cargo handling system of a vessel could trigger physical damage with potentially massive exposures. The current insurance framework addresses this only partially, with significant gaps that the market is working to close.
Maritime Security Operations
The interaction between war risks insurance and physical maritime security has become a substantial industry in its own right:
Maritime security companies: Firms providing armed guards, transit escorts, vessel hardening, threat intelligence and crisis response include Ambrey, MAST (Maritime Asset Security and Training), GoAGT, Diaplous Group, Solace Global and others. These firms work closely with war risks underwriters and brokers.
Intelligence services: Specialist intelligence providers (Risk Intelligence, Dryad Global, Control Risks Maritime, EOS Risk) provide threat assessments, vessel routing advice and incident analysis to underwriters and operators.
Reporting frameworks: UKMTO (United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations) provides central reporting for vessels in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea theatre. MSCHOA (Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa) coordinates the international response to Somali piracy. The Bahrain-based International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) coordinates Coalition responses in the Persian Gulf.
Industry coordination: BIMCO, INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO and the International Chamber of Shipping coordinate industry responses to maritime security challenges, working with underwriters and security providers to develop standardised contracts and best practices.
Pricing Dynamics and Market Capacity
The war risks market operates with limited dedicated capacity that fluctuates significantly with market conditions:
Lloyd’s syndicate participation: Approximately 15 to 20 Lloyd’s syndicates participate meaningfully in marine war risks, with leadership concentrated in a small number of specialist syndicates (Beazley, Hiscox, Brit, Munich Re Specialty, MS Amlin and a few others).
IUA company participation: A similar number of IUA companies offer marine war capacity, often as part of broader marine programmes.
Global capacity: Total committed marine war capacity is estimated at approximately 5 to 10 billion United States dollars, depending on the structure of layering and the specific peril cover. Major events can quickly consume significant portions of available capacity.
AP rate volatility: AP rates for transit through specific high-risk areas can change by orders of magnitude within hours of major events. The volatility creates significant operational challenges for charterers and shippers planning voyages.
Reinsurance capacity: War risks reinsurance is concentrated among a small group of specialist reinsurers, with capacity constraints regularly tightening following major events.
Hard market dynamics: The marine war risks market entered a sustained hard market from 2022 (Russian invasion of Ukraine) and accelerated through 2023-2024 (Houthi attacks, Iran tensions, multiple total losses). Rate increases of 100 percent or more have been common for high-risk transits, with continued firming expected through 2026.
Crew Implications of War Risk Trading
The decision to trade through high-risk areas has significant implications for crew, with multiple stakeholders involved:
ITF and crew unions: The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) has negotiated specific war zone provisions in collective bargaining agreements covering thousands of vessels. Standard ITF provisions include doubled basic wages, doubled death and disability compensation, paid leave for refusing transit, and right of repatriation at owner’s expense.
Flag state requirements: Some flag states impose additional requirements on vessels transiting high-risk areas, including pre-transit notifications, crew safety briefings and mandatory hardening measures.
Crew refusal rights: Most modern collective bargaining agreements give individual crew members the right to refuse to transit specified war zones. Refusing crew must be repatriated and replaced, creating logistical and cost implications for vessel operators.
Insurance for crew: P&I cover for crew personal injury and death is often supplemented by specific war zone bonus provisions and personal accident covers funded by the operator or charterer.
Mental health impact: Extended exposure to threats during high-risk transits has been documented as a significant mental health risk for seafarers, with the maritime mental health movement (Sailors’ Society, ISWAN, Stella Maris) providing support resources.
Settlement Examples and Recent Claims
Several recent war risks claims illustrate the practical operation of the cover:
Galaxy Leader (November 2023, Houthi seizure): Vehicle carrier seized by Houthi forces in the Red Sea, with crew held hostage. Hull war risks underwriters faced a complex detention situation with limited prospects for recovery. The vessel and crew were ultimately released in early 2025 after extended negotiations, but the incident became a benchmark for Red Sea war risk pricing.
True Confidence (March 2024): Bulk carrier struck by Houthi missile in the Bab el-Mandeb, with three crew killed. Total loss of vessel and major personal injury claims. Significant payouts under hull war risks and war risks P&I.
Tutor (June 2024): Bulk carrier struck by Houthi waterborne unmanned vehicle and missile, sinking in the Red Sea. Total loss of vessel.
Rubymar (March 2024): Bulk carrier struck by Houthi missile carrying fertilizer cargo, ultimately sinking with significant pollution concerns. Major hull war risks claim and complex environmental considerations.
Stena Impero (July 2019, Iran): Tanker seized by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, held for two months. Detention claim under war risks cover with eventual release without major hull damage.
Mercer Street (July 2021, Iran): Tanker struck by Iranian drone off Oman, with two crew killed. Personal injury claims under war risks P&I.
Ukraine Black Sea grain corridor incidents: Multiple Ukrainian and Romanian-flagged vessels struck by Russian missiles, with cumulative claims under the bespoke Black Sea grain insurance scheme.
Related Wiki Articles
- Hull and Machinery Insurance
- P&I Clubs and the International Group
- Loss of Hire Insurance
- Cargo Insurance and Institute Cargo Clauses
- General Average and York-Antwerp Rules
- Maritime Piracy and BMP
- LLMC Convention on Limitation of Maritime Claims
- Force Majeure in Shipping
- Voyage Charter Party
- Time Charter Party
References
- UK Marine Insurance Act 1906
- Institute War and Strikes Clauses (Hulls Time) 1/11/95
- Institute War and Strikes Clauses (Hulls Voyage) 1/11/95
- Institute War Clauses (Cargo) 1/1/09
- Institute Strikes Clauses (Cargo) 1/1/09
- Institute Time Clauses Hulls 1/11/95 (ITC-Hulls), Clause 23 War Exclusion
- Joint War Committee Hull War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils Listed Areas
- Lloyd’s Market Association Joint War Committee Circulars
- International Group of P&I Clubs Bio-Chem War Cover
- Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security (BMP-5)
- Best Management Practices for West Africa (BMP-WA)
- IMO Resolution A.1025(26) Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
- OFAC Sanctions Regulations (Russia, Iran, Yemen and other targeted programmes)
- EU Council Regulations on sanctions
- G7 Price Cap Coalition guidance on Russian oil price cap
- Hellenic War Risks Mutual Statutes and Rules
- US Maritime Administration War Risk Insurance Programme (Title XII)