ISM Code: International Safety Management Code

The International Safety Management (ISM) Code is the mandatory IMO framework requiring every company operating ships on international voyages to develop, implement and continuously improve a Safety Management System (SMS) that addresses safety and environmental protection. Adopted by the IMO Assembly as Resolution A.741(18) in November 1993 and made mandatory through SOLAS Chapter IX from 1 July 1998, the Code arose directly from the management failures identified in the Herald of Free Enterprise inquiry of 1987, which showed that systemic organisational failures ashore were as causally significant as acts or omissions on the bridge. The Code applies to companies and ships across 16 numbered elements, from the articulation of a safety and environmental policy through the maintenance of documented procedures, emergency preparedness, accident reporting and internal verification, to the periodic external audit required for certificate renewal. Compliance is verified through two certificates: the Document of Compliance (DOC) issued to the company and the Safety Management Certificate (SMC) issued to each ship, both carrying five-year validity subject to annual and intermediate verification. ShipCalculators.com offers dedicated tools for ISM compliance scheduling and gap analysis, all listed in the ShipCalculators.com calculator catalogue.

Contents

Background and origins

The Herald of Free Enterprise disaster

On 6 March 1987 the ro-ro passenger ferry Herald of Free Enterprise, owned by Townsend Thoresen and operated by P&O European Ferries, capsized in shallow water approximately one nautical mile off the Belgian port of Zeebrugge. The vessel sailed with her bow visor open and her inner bow door incompletely closed. Water flooded the open car deck within 90 seconds of the ship reaching open water and at speed; the ferry rolled sharply to port and settled on its side in 18 m of water. Of the 539 persons on board, 193 died - the worst British peacetime maritime disaster since the sinking of the Princess Victoria in 1953.

The subsequent formal investigation, conducted by Mr Justice Sheen and published as the Report of Court No. 8074 in July 1987, established the immediate cause as the failure of the assistant bosun to close the bow doors before departure, compounded by the failure of the officer responsible for the car deck to confirm closure because he had fallen asleep, and the failure of the master to receive any confirmation of closure before ordering sea speed. However, Justice Sheen’s most lasting finding went far beyond individual error. He described the management culture of the owning company as suffering from “the disease of sloppiness” and found evidence of what he called “infected with the disease of sloppiness from top to bottom.” Five separate requests from masters over the preceding years for an indicator light on the bridge to show the status of bow doors had been rejected or ignored by shore management. The inquiry concluded that the company bore a fundamental corporate responsibility: shore management had failed to establish an adequate system for ensuring that the ship was operated safely.

The Sheen Inquiry was not the first major maritime casualty to reveal management failure ashore as a contributing cause, but its findings were stated with unusual directness and were seized upon by the IMO. The inquiry report is widely credited as the single most important catalyst for the ISM Code.

IMO response and the development of the Code

In the years following the Herald disaster, the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) undertook a sustained programme of work to translate the findings into binding regulation. The working group drafting what would become the ISM Code proceeded from a core premise, stated in the preamble to the final text: “the safety and pollution prevention record of many ships is unsatisfactory” and “the root cause of accidents is poor management.” The group drew on voluntary guidelines already in place in the tanker sector (Shell’s TMSA, the International Safety Rating System used by some major operators) but concluded that the voluntary approach was insufficient because it reached only the more conscientious companies while leaving the weaker operators unchecked.

The IMO Assembly adopted the International Safety Management Code as Assembly Resolution A.741(18) on 4 November 1993 at the eighteenth session of the Assembly. The resolution urged flag states and companies to implement the Code on a voluntary basis pending its incorporation into a mandatory instrument. A further resolution, A.788(19) adopted in 1995, provided guidelines on implementation by administrations. The mandatory step came through the adoption of SOLAS Chapter IX, “Management for the safe operation of ships,” at the 1994 SOLAS Conference. Chapter IX makes the ISM Code mandatory by reference and establishes the certification structure.

Phased entry into force

Entry into force was phased by ship type and size to allow the industry time to build adequate SMS documentation and to permit administrations to train the surveyors and auditors who would conduct verifications:

1 July 1998: passenger ships (including passenger high-speed craft), oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers, and cargo high-speed craft of 500 GT and above engaged on international voyages.
1 July 2002: other cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) of 500 GT and above engaged on international voyages.

The phasing reflected the risk profile of the initial group: the vessel types brought in from 1998 carried the highest consequences of management failure, either in terms of potential for mass casualties (passenger ships) or environmental damage (tankers). The extension to general cargo ships and MODUs in 2002 completed the coverage at the 500 GT threshold; vessels below 500 GT on international voyages and vessels operating exclusively on domestic voyages are exempt from the mandatory Code, though many flag states and operators apply equivalent principles voluntarily.

Structure of the Code: the 16 elements

The ISM Code is divided into two parts. Part A (elements 1 through 13) contains the substantive requirements; Part B (elements 14 through 16) deals with certification, verification and control. The 16 elements form an integrated management cycle analogous in structure to the ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 management system standards, though the ISM Code predates both in its maritime application and uses a somewhat different taxonomy.

Element 1: general

Element 1 sets out the objectives of the Code and the definitions of key terms. The objectives are stated as ensuring safety at sea, preventing human injury or loss of life, and avoiding damage to the environment - particularly the marine environment - and to property. The element defines “company” as the shipowner or any other organisation or person, such as a manager or bareboat charterer, who has assumed responsibility for the operation of the ship from the shipowner. This definition of company is significant: it places the compliance obligation on whoever exercises operational control, not merely on legal title. A bareboat charterer who manages crew, maintenance, and operations falls within the definition; a time charterer who directs voyages but does not manage the vessel does not.

“Objective evidence” is defined as quantitative or qualitative information, records or statements of fact pertaining to safety or to the existence and implementation of an SMS element, which is based on observation, measurement or test and can be verified. This concept underpins the entire audit methodology: an auditor must find objective evidence that each element of the SMS exists and is functioning, not merely that a document asserting its existence is on file.

Element 2: safety and environmental protection policy

The company must establish a safety and environmental protection policy that describes how the objectives of the Code are to be achieved. The policy must be implemented and maintained at all levels of the organisation, both ashore and on board. In practice the policy is a written statement signed by the highest appropriate level of shore management - typically the chief executive or managing director - affirming the company’s commitment and setting out the core principles that guide the SMS. The policy is not a procedural document but a statement of intent; the procedures that give it operational meaning are built in subsequent elements.

The link between the written policy and actual management behaviour is scrutinised in audits. Auditors look for evidence that the policy is not merely a framed document in the captain’s cabin but is referenced in training programmes, discussed in safety meetings and reflected in management decisions including resource allocation. A company that states a policy of safety first but systematically fails to allocate maintenance budgets or crew-rest-period compliance receives non-conformity findings on element 2.

Element 3: company responsibilities and authority

Element 3 requires the company to define and document the responsibility, authority and interrelation of all personnel who manage, perform and verify work relating to safety and pollution prevention, particularly for persons in the company’s shore organisation. The element also requires the company to ensure that adequate resources and shore-based support are provided to enable the Designated Person Ashore to carry out the functions described in element 4.

This element gives structural content to the policy. It establishes who is responsible for what, to whom they report, and what authority they hold. An SMS with an elaborate hierarchy on paper but with no real allocation of decision-making authority or budget control fails element 3 on audit.

Element 4: designated person ashore

Element 4 requires every company to designate a person ashore (the Designated Person Ashore, universally abbreviated DPA) who has direct access to the highest level of management and who has defined and documented responsibility and authority for monitoring the safety and pollution-prevention aspects of the operation of each ship, and for ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are applied. The DPA is the organisational link between the ship and the shore management structure.

The requirement for direct access to the highest level of management is not merely a reporting line on an organigram. It means the DPA must be able to escalate any safety concern - including concerns about resource inadequacy or management pressure to compromise safety - to board or executive level without obstruction from intermediate management. In practice many administrations require the DPA to be an individual, not a committee, and to have authority to halt a ship’s departure pending resolution of a safety issue. The role can be held by a suitably qualified shore manager within a large company or by an external DPA service provider contracted by a smaller operator.

The DNV DPA class certificate calculator supports assessment of DPA qualification requirements under flag-state and classification-society guidelines.

Element 5: master’s responsibility and authority

Element 5 requires the company to clearly define and document the master’s responsibility with regard to: implementing the safety and environmental protection policy; motivating the crew in the observation of that policy; issuing appropriate orders and instructions in a clear and simple manner; verifying that specified requirements are observed; reviewing the SMS and reporting its deficiencies to shore management; and, critically, overriding any order from shore when safety or environmental protection is at stake.

The override power is perhaps the most operationally significant provision of the ISM Code. It establishes, in an international mandatory instrument, that the master’s authority to take whatever action safety demands supersedes commercial instructions. This principle had always been accepted in maritime law but the Code’s formal articulation of it resolved ambiguity in situations where commercial pressure from owners or charterers was applied directly to masters. A master who departs from a voyage order for safety reasons and records the decision and the reasons in the official log is exercising a right explicitly protected by element 5, and any company that sanctions the master for doing so is in breach of the Code.

Element 5 is also the basis for the master’s review of the SMS: at intervals defined in the SMS itself (typically annually), the master must review the SMS and report observations to shore management, with the findings retained as objective evidence for audits.

Element 6: resources and personnel

Element 6 requires the company to ensure that: the master is properly qualified for command; the master is given the necessary support so that the master’s duties can be safely performed; each ship is manned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and international requirements; new personnel and personnel transferred to new assignments are given proper familiarisation with their duties; and personnel performing specific tasks related to safety and pollution prevention are given appropriate instruction.

The qualification requirements cross-reference the STCW Convention: certificates of competency required under STCW form part of the objective evidence for element 6. Familiarisation is a recurring audit topic: administrations frequently find that ships carry crew members who have not received ship-specific safety familiarisation before commencing duties, particularly on vessels that frequently change personnel. The SMS must contain documented familiarisation procedures specifying what information is to be conveyed, who delivers it, what acknowledgement is required and how it is recorded. The STCW certification checker for OOW tanker endorsements and the STCW polar/ice navigation certificate checker support verification of crew qualification against route and cargo requirements.

Manning levels are a direct element-6 concern. The Safe Manning Certificate issued by the flag Administration under SOLAS Chapter V Regulation V/14 sets the minimum number of officers and ratings required for the ship’s safe operation; the minimum manning under MLC calculator and the MLC rest hours calculator support demonstration that crews are sufficient in number and adequately rested for their duties, both of which are prerequisites for genuine element-6 compliance. The MLC work hours calculator applies the limits from the Maritime Labour Convention and MLC 2006 to recorded work and rest schedules.

Element 7: development of plans for shipboard operations

Element 7 requires the company to establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning safety and pollution prevention. Such operations include, but are not limited to, cargo operations, bunkering, navigation in restricted visibility, manoeuvring in confined waters, response to machinery failure, and enclosed-space entry. The specific operations to be addressed by procedures are determined by a risk-assessment process that evaluates the likelihood and consequence of each identified hazard.

Risk assessment under the ISM Code is guided by IMO Circular MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.7 (2013), which sets out a formal risk-management methodology for use in developing SMS procedures. The methodology requires the company to identify hazards, assess the associated risk using a frequency-severity matrix, determine and implement risk controls, and review the residual risk. Procedures and checklists produced through this process constitute the operational core of the SMS.

Navigational procedures are a principal focus of element-7 audits, in part because poor navigation remains a leading cause of maritime casualties. Passage planning procedures must address route selection, identification of hazardous areas, contingency plans for engine or steering failure, and reporting obligations. The SMS must also contain anchoring and mooring procedures, engine room operating procedures including critical-operations permits, and bunkering procedures that address spill prevention - a cross-reference to MARPOL Convention requirements.

Element 8: emergency preparedness

Element 8 requires the company to identify and describe emergency situations that may arise on board the ship and to establish procedures for responding to such situations. These procedures must define the roles of the master, the officers and the crew in each emergency scenario, ensure that relevant training and drills are conducted at the specified intervals, and maintain sufficient information about the ship and its systems to support emergency response. The company must also ensure that the master is not inhibited from taking emergency action by any other consideration.

Emergency drills are the most visible manifestation of element 8. SOLAS Chapter III requires muster drills and abandon-ship drills at specified intervals; the SOLAS fire drill frequency calculator implements these requirements. Emergency drills under the ISM SMS go beyond the SOLAS minimum to include machinery-space emergencies, cargo incidents, man-overboard situations, and pollution responses. Records of drills, including a record of crew performance and any deficiencies identified, must be maintained as objective evidence.

Emergency preparedness also requires an up-to-date inventory of emergency contacts ashore - including the DPA’s direct telephone number and a second-line contact - and a muster list that is updated whenever crew composition changes. The emergency information must be posted in prominent locations on board and must be available in the working language of the crew as well as in English.

Element 9: reports and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and hazardous occurrences

Element 9 requires the company to establish procedures ensuring that non-conformities (including near-misses), accidents and hazardous occurrences are reported to it, are investigated and analysed with the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention, and that the SMS is amended accordingly. The element is the learning loop of the Code: it transforms individual incidents into systemic improvements.

A non-conformity under the ISM Code is an observed situation where objective evidence indicates that a specific requirement of the Code or of the SMS is not being fulfilled. A major non-conformity is an identifiable deviation that poses a serious threat to personnel or ship safety or a serious risk to the environment and requires immediate corrective action, or is the absence of effective and systematic implementation of a requirement of the Code. Observations, as distinct from non-conformities, are statements of fact made during the audit that indicate a potential area for improvement; they do not require corrective action but are noted for the company’s attention.

The distinction between a non-conformity and a major non-conformity determines the administrative consequence. A non-conformity requires the company to identify the root cause, implement corrective action, and demonstrate to the verifying authority that the action is completed within an agreed timeframe - normally before or at the next verification. A major non-conformity may result in the suspension of the DOC or SMC. The ISM internal audit calculator supports scheduling and recording of internal non-conformity findings in a format aligned with the corrective-action documentation expected at external audits.

The requirement to report near-misses (hazardous occurrences) is particularly important. The concept, borrowed from aviation safety theory, holds that near-misses are informative precursors to accidents: the chain of causation was interrupted before injury or damage resulted, but the underlying hazard remains. A company that actively encourages and systematically analyses near-miss reports demonstrates a safety culture consistent with the objectives of the Code. A company whose records show no near-miss reports over a multi-year period is more likely exhibiting under-reporting than an absence of risk.

Element 10: maintenance of the ship and equipment

Element 10 requires the company to establish procedures ensuring that the ship is maintained in conformity with applicable rules and regulations, statutory requirements, and classification society requirements, and that any additional requirements established by the company are also met. The SMS must address the inspection and maintenance of all equipment whose failure would create a danger to ship safety or the marine environment, maintenance of records documenting all inspections and maintenance activities, and identification of equipment and technical systems whose sudden operational failure may result in a hazardous situation - these being designated as critical equipment or systems.

Critical equipment typically includes main propulsion and steering, navigation equipment, firefighting systems, bilge and ballast systems, cargo control systems on tankers, and life-saving appliances. Each piece of critical equipment must have an identified maintenance interval, a responsible officer, and documented maintenance records. The planned maintenance system (PMS) is the operational tool through which element-10 requirements are implemented; many vessels use computerised PMS software that generates maintenance work orders and records completions.

The interaction between element 10 and the ship’s class maintenance requirements is direct: the annual class survey and the five-year special survey both examine the same equipment and structural elements that the SMS’s maintenance records should be tracking. A gap between SMS maintenance records and class survey findings is a predictable source of element-10 non-conformities.

Element 11: documentation

Element 11 requires the company to establish and maintain procedures to control all documents and data relevant to the SMS. This encompasses the procedures for creating, distributing, updating and retiring SMS documents; ensuring that current versions of all relevant documents are available in all relevant locations both ashore and on board; and controlling the flow of information between ship and shore. The element mirrors the document-control requirements familiar from ISO 9001.

In practice element-11 compliance requires a version-control system for SMS manuals and procedures, a distribution list confirming that each ship holds the current revision, and a means of ensuring that superseded documents are removed from use. SMS manuals on board must be clearly identified as current; a ship carrying a manual that is two revisions behind the version held by the shore office is exhibiting a documentation failure even if the operational procedures in the two versions are identical.

The element also encompasses the operational records that provide objective evidence of SMS implementation: drill records, maintenance logs, near-miss reports, training records, audit findings and corrective-action responses. The balance between paper-based and electronic record systems varies widely by operator; the Code is neutral on the medium as long as records are reliable, retrievable and protected from loss.

Element 12: company verification, review and evaluation

Element 12 requires the company to carry out internal safety audits on board ships at intervals not exceeding 12 months to verify that activities relating to safety and pollution prevention comply with the SMS. The company must also periodically evaluate the efficiency of the SMS and, when necessary, review it. The internal audit must be conducted by suitably qualified personnel not directly responsible for the area being audited; the auditor must have no direct line-management conflict of interest with the activities under review.

Internal audits under element 12 are conceptually distinct from the external verification audits conducted by the flag Administration or by a Recognised Organisation (RO) acting on its behalf. The internal audit is a self-assessment mechanism; its findings should feed the corrective-action cycle of element 9 before an external audit identifies the same deficiencies. Companies that treat the internal audit as a box-ticking exercise and consistently report zero non-conformities in internal records while external audits find multiple non-conformities are demonstrating an element-12 failure.

The annual management review, required under element 12, mirrors the management review in ISO 14001. It should examine: the results of internal audits; the status of corrective and preventive actions; accident and near-miss statistics; crew feedback and observations; regulatory changes affecting the SMS; company performance against safety objectives; and resource requirements. The ISM internal audit calculator supports scheduling of internal audits, and the ISM SMS gap-analysis score calculator provides a structured assessment of each element against the Code’s requirements.

Element 13: certification, verification and control

Element 13 describes the system by which companies and ships are externally verified. The flag Administration or an RO authorised by it must verify that the SMS complies with the requirements of the Code before issuing certificates. Verification takes the form of an initial audit prior to first certification and periodic verification audits during the certificate validity period. Port state control (PSC) officers may examine the DOC and SMC during port inspections and may examine the implementation of the SMS on board.

Element 14: interim certification

Element 14 provides for the issuance of interim DOCs and interim SMCs to allow companies to demonstrate initial compliance when a new company is established, when a new ship type is added to an existing company’s fleet, or when management of a ship is transferred to a company not previously certified for that ship type. An interim DOC is valid for not more than 12 months; an interim SMC is valid for not more than six months, extendable by the Administration in specific circumstances to not more than 12 months. Interim certificates are subject to a verification visit to confirm that the basic SMS elements are in place.

Element 15: forms of verification

Element 15 describes the types of audit: the initial verification (leading to first-issue of the DOC or SMC), the periodic verification (annual for SMC, annual or intermediate for DOC), and the renewal verification (leading to a new five-year certificate). A verification for renewal must be completed before the current certificate expires. The element also addresses the rules for verification after the certificate has been suspended or withdrawn.

Element 16: issue and validity of certificate

Element 16 addresses the mechanics of certificate issue and endorsement. The DOC is issued to the company for each type of ship it operates; if a company operates tankers, bulk carriers and general cargo ships, it must hold a separate DOC endorsement for each type. The SMC is issued to the individual ship. Both the DOC and the SMC are valid for five years and are subject to annual verification for the SMC (with one intermediate verification between the second and third anniversary, or between the second and fourth for the DOC). Annual verifications must take place within a three-month window around each anniversary date. The ISM DOC cycle calculator assists companies in scheduling the annual endorsement windows and renewal audits across a mixed fleet.

The Document of Compliance and Safety Management Certificate

Document of Compliance

The DOC is issued to the company by the flag Administration (or by an RO on its behalf) following a successful initial verification that the company’s SMS meets all requirements of the Code for the applicable ship type(s). The DOC serves as proof that the company is qualified under the Code to operate ships of the types listed on the certificate. A company wishing to operate a new ship type must undergo an additional verification for that type before the DOC is endorsed to cover it.

The DOC is issued for a five-year period and must be endorsed annually, following a verification that the company’s SMS continues to meet the requirements of the Code. The endorsement window is the three months before and after the anniversary of the issue date. Failure to obtain the endorsement within this window does not automatically invalidate the DOC but triggers a flag-state review; if the SMS has deteriorated materially, suspension or withdrawal may follow.

A copy of the DOC, or a document certified by the Administration confirming that the DOC has been issued, must be carried on board each ship operated by the company.

Safety Management Certificate

The SMC is issued to the individual ship, not the company. It certifies that the company and its shipboard management operate in accordance with an approved SMS. The SMC is issued for five years and is endorsed annually (between nine and three months before the first, second and fourth anniversary dates) and at one intermediate verification (between the second and third anniversary). The harmonisation of DOC and SMC verification schedules with the broader HSSC framework means that flag-state auditors can coordinate ISM verification visits with class renewal and MARPOL certificate endorsements, reducing the total number of visits to the ship.

An SMC is rendered invalid if the company’s DOC ceases to be valid for the relevant ship type, or if the ship is transferred to a different company. When management responsibility transfers, the new company must obtain an interim SMC from the outset of its management period; it cannot continue to operate under the previous company’s SMC.

Suspension and withdrawal

Both the DOC and the SMC may be suspended or withdrawn if a major non-conformity is identified and not remedied within the period specified by the Administration, or if verification shows that the SMS is not being effectively implemented. Suspension of the DOC removes the company’s authority to operate any ship for which that DOC type is the relevant endorsement; a suspended company faces an immediate commercial crisis. Suspension of the SMC means the ship in question may not proceed to sea until the major non-conformity is addressed and the Administration reinstates or reissues the certificate.

The SOLAS Regulation IX/3 check calculator addresses the company certification requirement, and the SOLAS Regulation IX/4 check calculator covers the ship certification requirement, both as they appear in the Convention text.

The Designated Person Ashore in practice

The DPA is the most structurally novel feature of the ISM Code. Before the Code, shore management in many shipping companies had no formal legal obligation to maintain a direct safety-oversight function connected to ship operations. The DPA requirement creates an identified individual who is legally and organisationally accountable for monitoring safety performance across the company’s fleet.

In large companies operating fleets of 30 or more vessels, the DPA function is usually a full-time role filled by a senior officer or naval architect with operational experience. The DPA maintains oversight of SMS compliance, manages the corrective-action register, liaises with flag state and classification society auditors, and reports to the board on safety performance metrics. Direct access to the highest level of management means in practice that the DPA can attend board meetings where safety budgets are discussed and can challenge operational decisions that compromise safety without referral through intermediate management layers.

In smaller companies operating two or three vessels, the DPA role is often combined with another senior management function - technical superintendent, fleet manager or even chief executive - provided the independence requirement is met. An Administration may question whether a DPA who is simultaneously responsible for commercial operations can genuinely maintain independence when those functions conflict. The ISM Code does not prohibit dual roles but requires that the DPA’s access to the highest management level is genuine and documented.

The IMO has not set formal qualification requirements for DPAs, leaving this to flag states and classification societies. Several flag states and ROs require the DPA to hold a Certificate of Competency at a senior officer level plus documented experience in SMS management. The DNV DPA class certificate calculator reflects the qualification criteria used by DNV, one of the principal ROs conducting ISM verifications worldwide.

ISM audits: scope and methodology

An ISM audit is an evidence-based process in which the auditor systematically examines the company’s or ship’s SMS against the 16 elements of the Code, looking for objective evidence that each element exists in documented form and is implemented in practice. The audit is not a checklist exercise: the auditor must assess whether the SMS functions as a system, whether the elements reinforce each other, and whether the safety culture reflected in the SMS documents is the safety culture actually practised on board and ashore.

Audit findings are classified as:

Observation: a statement of fact indicating a potential area of improvement, not requiring corrective action but noted for the company’s attention.
Non-conformity: an identified situation where objective evidence shows that a specific requirement is not fulfilled. Requires a corrective action plan with a defined completion date.
Major non-conformity: an identified deviation that poses a serious threat to personnel or ship safety or a serious risk to the marine environment and requires immediate corrective action, or the absence of effective and systematic implementation of a Code requirement. The consequence may be suspension or withholding of the certificate.

The flag state audit / IMSAS calculator supports preparation for the IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS) mandatory audit of flag-state administrations under SOLAS Chapter XIII, which includes verification that the flag state’s ISM certification processes are functioning correctly.

The ISM audit must be distinguished from the PSC inspection. A PSC officer examining an ISM-certified vessel is primarily checking that the SMC and DOC are valid and carried on board, and that the observable condition of the ship is consistent with the claims made in the SMS. A PSC officer who finds that the documented maintenance schedule for a piece of equipment has not been followed in 18 months has grounds for a deficiency finding under the ISM Code irrespective of whether a formal ISM audit has taken place. The link between PSC deficiency statistics and ISM Code compliance is therefore direct; poor PSC performance is often a leading indicator of SMS failure. The PSC targeted inspection calculator implements the targeting model used by several MOU regimes.

Bow Mariner (2004)

The chemical and petroleum tanker Bow Mariner exploded and sank in the Atlantic Ocean approximately 50 nautical miles east of Virginia on 28 February 2004, killing 21 of the 27 crew. The vessel was cleaning cargo tanks in preparation for loading fuel oil. The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation found that the crew had failed to follow the SMS procedures for tank-cleaning operations, had not completed the required risk assessment before venting, and had used a non-intrinsically-safe vacuum cleaner in a space containing explosive vapours. The investigation also found that the company’s SMS, while formally compliant and certified, was not effectively implemented: training records were inadequate, the near-miss reporting system was not used, and management-review findings from internal audits showed persistent, unresolved maintenance deficiencies. The case became a reference example in ISM training for the distinction between nominal SMS compliance - holding a valid SMC - and genuine SMS implementation.

Sewol (2014)

The passenger ferry Sewol sank on 16 April 2014 off the south-west coast of South Korea while carrying 476 people, principally high school students on a field trip; 304 died. The vessel capsized after a sharp turn in overloaded and improperly secured conditions. The investigation found that the operating company, Chonghaejin Marine, had: systematically overloaded the vessel to increase cargo revenue; modified the ship by adding passenger accommodation weight above the car deck without recalculating stability; failed to maintain proper ballast to compensate for the increased top weight; and operated a Safety Management System that was certified but not implemented. The DPA had no effective oversight of loading operations. The master was absent from the bridge during the critical manoeuvre. The failure of the abandon-ship order to be given for over 30 minutes after the vessel began listing catastrophically compounded the loss of life.

The Sewol disaster attracted particular attention because the South Korean administration’s certification process was conducted by a Korean Register-linked entity and audits had not detected the accumulation of systematic non-conformities. The investigation led to substantial reform of South Korea’s maritime safety administration and contributed to IMO discussions on the quality of ISM verification conducted by delegated ROs.

El Faro (2015)

The US-flagged cargo ship El Faro sank in Hurricane Joaquin on 1 October 2015 in the Atlantic Ocean east of the Bahamas, with the loss of all 33 crew. The vessel sailed from Jacksonville, Florida, on 29 September 2015 on a voyage to Puerto Rico despite weather forecasts that placed Hurricane Joaquin - a rapidly intensifying Category 4 hurricane at the time of sinking - directly on the projected track. The National Transportation Safety Board investigation, which recovered the voyage data recorder in April 2016, found that the master had underestimated the storm’s intensity and track, had not used the best available weather-routing service, had failed to deviate from the planned route despite multiple indications of deteriorating conditions, and had not activated the emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) until the ship was irretrievably flooding. The investigation identified deficiencies in the company’s SMS for voyage planning, weather-routing procedures and passage-plan review. A recurring theme in the VDR transcript was the master’s reluctance to divert because of commercial pressures, raising element-5 concerns about whether the master’s override authority was genuinely supported by the company culture.

The El Faro disaster led to NTSB recommendations for enhanced requirements for weather-routing system use in the US domestic flag fleet and contributed to IMO discussions on passage planning and SOLAS Chapter V revision.

Interaction with other mandatory instruments

SOLAS

The ISM Code is made mandatory by SOLAS Chapter IX, which simultaneously places it in the hierarchy of the world’s principal maritime safety convention. The relationship is symbiotic: virtually every operational requirement in SOLAS Chapters II through XV generates a corresponding SMS procedure. Fire-detection system maintenance under Chapter II-2, muster drills under Chapter III, radio watchkeeping under Chapter IV, and passage planning under Chapter V each require not only the physical capability or equipment but documented procedures, assigned responsibilities and training records. An SMS that does not address these SOLAS procedural dimensions is incomplete regardless of its coverage of the 16 Code elements. The full SOLAS framework is described in the SOLAS Convention article.

MARPOL

The MARPOL Convention Annexes I through VI impose environmental-protection obligations that parallel the SMS requirements of the ISM Code. MARPOL Annex I procedures for oil-record-book maintenance and oily-water separator operation must be incorporated into the SMS. Annex VI procedures for fuel changeover when entering sulphur Emission Control Areas (SOx ECAs) and for NOx-related maintenance of Tier II and Tier III diesel engines similarly require documented procedures, designated responsibilities and training. The connection between the SMS and MARPOL Annex VI is particularly close for vessels subject to the IMO 2020 sulphur cap: the changeover procedure, segregation of compliant and non-compliant fuel, and record-keeping are all SMS elements as well as MARPOL obligations.

STCW

The STCW Convention supplies the qualification baseline for ISM element 6. STCW certificates of competency define the minimum training and experience required for each watchkeeping rank; the SMS must specify that personnel are qualified to the applicable STCW standard and must document the familiarisation process that supplements the generic STCW training with ship-specific knowledge. The STCW Convention also imposes maximum hours-of-work and minimum hours-of-rest requirements that the SMS must reflect in watchkeeping schedules; a SMS that schedules work patterns incompatible with STCW rest-hour limits is non-compliant on both instruments simultaneously.

MLC 2006

The Maritime Labour Convention (MLC 2006) supplements the ISM Code’s element-6 requirements with detailed standards for seafarer employment contracts, wages, accommodation, catering, medical care, and social security. While the MLC is enforced through its own certification regime (the Maritime Labour Certificate and the Declaration of Maritime Labour Compliance), its requirements are operationally implemented through SMS procedures on vessels subject to both instruments. The MLC’s requirements on hours of work and rest are expressed in the same terms as STCW; a unified rest-hours monitoring procedure covering both instruments is the standard SMS approach. The MLC rest-hours calculator and the MLC minimum manning calculator support compliance documentation under both instruments.

ISPS Code

The ISPS Code, incorporated into SOLAS Chapter XI-2, requires the company to designate a Company Security Officer (CSO) who in many companies is the same individual as the DPA, or who works in close coordination with the DPA. The ship security plan required under the ISPS Code and the SMS required under the ISM Code are conceptually parallel but legally distinct: the ship security plan must be approved by the flag Administration or a Recognised Security Organisation, while the SMS is approved through the ISM certification process. In operational practice the two documents may be integrated or cross-referenced, provided both meet their respective substantive requirements. IMO has encouraged integration of security and safety management in guidance circulars but has not required it.

MSC.428(98): maritime cyber risk management

IMO Resolution MSC.428(98), adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee in June 2017, confirmed that maritime cyber risk management should be reflected in the SMS. The resolution set a target date of 1 January 2021 as the deadline from which flag-state administrations should verify, during the first annual verification of the DOC on or after that date, that cyber risks are addressed in the SMS. The implementing guidance, IMO MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3, provides a framework for identifying and managing cyber risks covering the identification of critical systems, the assessment of vulnerabilities, the development of protective measures and detection procedures, and the response and recovery plan. In practice cyber risk management is now an element-7 and element-10 matter: identified critical cyber systems (ECDIS, GMDSS, AIS transponders, automated cargo systems, propulsion-control networks) must have maintenance and recovery procedures within the SMS, and vulnerabilities must be assessed through the risk-assessment process of MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.7.

The 2021 deadline was the first instance of a technology-specific requirement being imposed within the ISM Code framework by resolution rather than a SOLAS amendment, a precedent likely to be followed as autonomous and remotely operated vessel technologies develop and interact with the SMS structure.

Charter party implications

BIMCO Standard ISM Clause

Most time charter and voyage charter parties now incorporate an ISM warranty either expressly or by implication. BIMCO publishes a Standard ISM Clause for time charter parties requiring the owner to maintain a valid DOC and a valid SMC throughout the charter period, to notify the charterer promptly if either certificate is suspended or withdrawn, and to indemnify the charterer for any losses arising from ISM non-compliance. The charter party context makes the DOC and SMC commercially significant beyond their regulatory function: a vessel trading under a time charter party in which the SMC lapses or is suspended is in immediate breach of charter, exposing the owner to off-hire claims and potentially to repudiation.

BIMCO’s clause also addresses the common situation where a vessel is bareboat chartered: since the bareboat charterer is the “company” for ISM purposes, the charterer is responsible for the DOC as well as the SMC. Voyage charterers are not required to hold any ISM certificate, but a voyage charter party on GENCON or similar terms typically incorporates an ISM warranty by reference to the ship’s seaworthiness obligations under the applicable bill of lading rules.

Bill of lading and cargo liability

The ISM-compliant status of a vessel is relevant to seaworthiness analysis under the Hague-Visby Rules. A ship operated without a valid SMC - a ship not managed in accordance with an approved SMS - may be found unseaworthy in the ISM sense, potentially depriving the carrier of the benefit of the due-diligence defence under the Rules. While courts in major commercial jurisdictions have not yet developed a consistent body of case law directly linking ISM non-compliance to cargo claims, the academic and professional consensus is that ISM status is a material element of seaworthiness in the modern sense of that term.

The bill of lading article describes the cargo documentation framework in which ISM compliance sits.

Port state control and ISM verification

PSC inspections do not constitute ISM audits, but PSC officers are entitled to examine ISM-related documentation and may issue deficiency notices citing ISM Code non-compliance. The most common ISM deficiencies identified in PSC records are:

SMS procedures not available in the working language of the crew.
Drill records absent or demonstrating that drills were not conducted at the required intervals.
Maintenance records for critical equipment incomplete or showing overdue items.
Near-miss report forms present on board but with no reports filed in the preceding 12 months - suggesting under-reporting rather than absence of risk.
DOC not on board (a copy or an Administration-certified confirmation must be carried).
SMS manual not the current revision (document-control failure under element 11).
Familiarisation records absent for new crew members recently joined.

A pattern of ISM-related PSC deficiencies is a strong indicator of SMS implementation failure even in the absence of a formal major non-conformity finding at an ISM audit. Multiple detentions for ISM deficiencies place the vessel in a high-risk category under the PSC targeting algorithms of the Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU. The port state control article describes the full PSC framework and the targeting models used by the principal regional MoUs.

Current developments and challenges

ISM Code review 2018

The 2018 review of the ISM Code, conducted at MSC 100, produced Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations (MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8) and updated guidance on auditor qualifications. The review recognised that the original 1993 text had remained largely unchanged while the operational context of shipping had evolved substantially - electronic documentation systems, remote monitoring of machinery, crew reduction, and the proliferation of third-party management structures all raised questions about how the 16 elements applied in practice. The revised guidelines provided clarification on the evidence expected for each element and encouraged administrations to adopt risk-based approaches to scheduling verification visits rather than treating all ship types equally.

Third-party ship management

A significant operational development since the Code was adopted is the growth of third-party ship management, in which a specialist management company provides crew, technical management and SMS services to an owning company that holds the ship as a financial asset rather than an operational business. In this structure the management company is the “company” for ISM purposes and holds the DOC; the owning entity may not itself be involved in SMS activities. The Code is neutral on this arrangement as long as the management company holds a valid DOC and the ship holds a valid SMC, and as long as the ship owner’s oversight of the management company’s performance is sufficient to meet any contractual or regulatory obligations the owner may have independent of the ISM Code. Shipbrokers and financiers examining a vessel’s compliance record have become accustomed to distinguishing between the DOC holder’s performance and the underlying owner’s history.

Interaction with classification society rules

Classification societies acting as Recognised Organisations on behalf of flag states conduct the majority of ISM audits worldwide. The IACS Resolution A.739(18) procedures govern the authorisation of ROs to conduct ISM surveys, and IACS Unified Requirement (UR) A.739(18) sets the competency standards for ISM auditors employed by member societies. The classification society article describes the broader relationship between class rules and flag-state mandatory requirements.

Autonomous and remotely operated vessels

The growth of autonomous and remotely operated ship concepts presents a structural challenge for the ISM Code. Elements 4, 5, 6 and 8 all assume a master and crew on board in the traditional sense. The MASS regulatory scoping exercise completed at MSC 103 in 2021 identified the ISM Code as one of the instruments requiring substantial revision or supplementation before highly autonomous ships can operate within a compliant framework. Interim guidance acknowledges that the DPA’s remote-monitoring role may expand substantially in remotely operated vessel concepts, and that emergency-preparedness procedures (element 8) must be adapted for scenarios in which no crew is physically present to respond on board.

Integration with energy efficiency management

The IMO Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP), mandatory under MARPOL Annex VI for all ships of 400 GT and above, is the environmental-management counterpart to the ISM SMS. Part III of the SEEMP, introduced for vessels subject to CII requirements from 1 January 2023, requires a three-year corrective action plan when the vessel’s CII rating falls below a defined threshold. While the SEEMP is a MARPOL instrument and the SMS is an ISM/SOLAS instrument, they share the same document-control, record-keeping and management-review logic. Many operators integrate SEEMP monitoring and CII tracking into their SMS management-review cycle. The CII attained calculator supports the operational assessment of fuel and distance data required for CII rating under the SEEMP framework. See also what is CII and what is EEXI for the technical background on the energy-efficiency indicators.

References

IMO. International Safety Management (ISM) Code and Guidelines on Implementation, 2018 edition. IMO Publishing, London. Sales No. IB117E.
IMO Assembly. Resolution A.741(18) - International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code). IMO, London, 1993.
IMO Assembly. Resolution A.788(19) - Guidelines on Implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations. IMO, London, 1995.
Department of Transport (United Kingdom). MV Herald of Free Enterprise: Report of Court No. 8074. HMSO, London, 1987. (The Sheen Report.)
IMO. Revised Guidelines on Implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations (MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8). IMO, London, 2018.
IMO. Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the IMO Rule-Making Process (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12). IMO, London, 2013.
IMO. Risk evaluation for the Application of IMO Instruments (MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.7). IMO, London, 2013.
IMO. Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3). IMO, London, 2017.
IMO. Resolution MSC.428(98) - Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management Systems. IMO, London, 2017.
US National Transportation Safety Board. Marine Accident Report: Explosion and Sinking of US Chemical Tanker Bow Mariner (NTSB/MAR-04/04). Washington DC, 2004.
US National Transportation Safety Board. Marine Accident Report: Sinking of US Cargo Vessel El Faro (NTSB/MAR-17/01). Washington DC, 2017.
Republic of Korea Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries. Final Investigation Report: MV Sewol. Seoul, 2014.
BIMCO. Standard ISM Clause for Time Charter Parties. BIMCO, Copenhagen, 2005 (revised 2010).
Gold, E., Chircop, A. and Kindred, H. Maritime Law, 2nd edition. Irwin Law, Toronto, 2015.
Knapp, S. and Franses, P.H. “A global view on port state control: econometric analysis of the differences across port state control regimes.” Maritime Policy and Management, vol. 34, no. 5, 2007, pp. 453-482.

External links

IMO ISM Code page - official IMO text, guidelines and status of implementation
IMO Resolution A.741(18) - original Assembly resolution adopting the Code
BIMCO ISM Clause documentation - BIMCO standard contract clauses relating to ISM compliance